Category Archives: OPRA Q&As

Supreme Court Rules Dash Cams Pertaining to Criminal Investigations Are Not Subject to OPRA

This week, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a split decision (4-3) in Paff v. Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office and once again ruled that dash camera videos that pertain to criminal investigations are not subject to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA).

While the decision is a serious disappointment to transparency advocates, it does not actually change the status quo. Last year, in North Jersey Media Group Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that the dash cam video of a police-involved deadly shooting was not subject to OPRA because there was no Attorney General (AG) guideline or other law (statute, regulation, etc.) that required it to be made or maintained.[1]

The Court made it clear in Lyndhurst, however, that dash camera videos of police shootings should generally be released under the common law right of access within a few days of an incident. The AG subsequently issued a directive requiring their release within 20 days.

In Lyndhurst, the Court specifically said that it was not answering the question presented by Paff (which was pending on the Court’s docket): whether a directive by a local chief of police could satisfy the “required by law” standard, just as an AG directive does. Thus, the Paff case became a new opportunity for transparency advocates to convince the Court that dash camera videos are accessible under OPRA.

Unfortunately, the Court rejected that argument and thus the law remains the same: dash camera videos are only available under the common law right of access. But, it was a very close decision (4-3). Justice Albin wrote a biting dissent, which Justice LaVecchia and Justice Timpone joined, concluding that “[i]n the wake of today’s majority opinion, the operations of our government will be less transparent and our citizenry less informed, which may lead to greater misunderstanding and more distrust between the public and the police.”

We think Justice Albin’s assessment is right and we hope that the Legislature or the Attorney General will accept his invitation for action:

In accordance with Lyndhurst, the Attorney General or the Legislature can undo the damage caused by today’s decision. The Attorney General can adopt a statewide policy that addresses whether and how police video recordings are made and maintained, as he did with Use of Force Reports.

The public — particularly marginalized communities — will have greater trust in the police when law enforcement activities are transparent.

The public pays for the dash cameras. Why can’t we see the videos?

What Videos are Still Available?

  • Dash Cam Videos Relating to Crimes: These are probably not available under OPRA in most circumstances, but generally should be available under the common law per Lyndhurst.
  • Dash Cam Videos of Police Using Deadly Force: Same. Also, AG Directive 2018-1 requires disclosure under the common law within 20 days if the video depicts a deadly shooting or an incident where police use force that results in “serious bodily injury.”
  • Dash Cam Videos of a DWI: A DWI is not a crime, so these should generally be available under OPRA.
  • Dash Cam Videos of Traffic Stops: These should generally be available, unless the traffic stop turns criminal.
  • Body Camera Videos: We think these should be subject to OPRA because an AG Guideline requires them to be maintained. At the same time, the AG Guideline attempts to exempt body cam videos relating to criminal investigations. We have this issue pending on appeal.
  • Security Camera Videos: The Supreme Court ruled in 2016 that security camera videos are not subject to OPRA, but access should be granted under the common law where a person states a sufficient interest in the video.

PSWH partner CJ Griffin submitted a brief on behalf of several amicus curiae and participated in the nearly three-hour oral argument. Griffin has litigated dozens of police records cases, including Lyndhurst.  Contact CJ at cgriffin@pashmanstein.com


[1] A criminal investigatory record is a record that is 1) held by a law enforcement agency; 2) pertain to any criminal investigation and 3) are “not required by law to be made, maintained, or kept on file.”

Advertisements

Court Issues Jail Death Records Opinion

On June 4, 2018, the Appellate Division issued an unpublished OPRA opinion titled Benedetto v Russo and Union County. While the opinion is not binding on lower courts because it is unpublished, we think it is helpful in several ways.

First, the case involves very important records: incident reports regarding suicide and suspicious deaths within a County Correctional Facility. Given the widespread coverage regarding several deaths in the Hudson County Jail recently, it is important that the public has access to information about these deaths and the conditions inside the jail.

In this case, Union County argued that the incident reports regarding jail deaths could not be disclosed because N.J.A.C. 10A:31-6.10(a)(4) exempts “[a]ny information relating to medical, psychiatric or psychological history, diagnosis, treatment or evaluation.”  Additionally, Union County argued that records relating to drug overdoses could not be disclosed pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:31-6.10(a)(3), which exempts a “record, which consists of any alcohol, drug or other substance abuse information, testing, assessment, evaluation, report, summary, history, recommendation or treatment.” Thus, Union County argued the incident reports were medical records and exempt pursuant to both of those regulations.

The trial court ruled that these exemptions did not apply. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that the requestor did not seek “inmate medical records,” but rather sought “incident reports.” This is an important ruling because public agencies frequently try to categorize a record as something it is not.

The second reason this case is important is because it reinforces the rule that public agencies cannot meet their burden of proving that a record is exempt simply by making factual assertions in legal briefs. Instead, public agencies must produce affidavits, certifications, or other “legally competent evidence” if it wishes to cite facts not in the record. Unsworn assertions by attorneys in a brief are simply not evidential.

Too often in an OPRA case, a public agency will produce no evidence whatsoever and will ask the trial court to accept what was argued in a brief or to make a ruling based on assumptions. This case confirmed that is not acceptable.

Please contact CJ Griffin at cgriffin@pashmanstein.com or 201.270.4930 for further information.

Are Survey Results Subject to OPRA?

Government agencies often distribute surveys to the public regarding various issues of public concern. Are the completed surveys subject to public access under OPRA? We think so and a court is being asked to decide.

Recently, we learned of an OPRA lawsuit filed by a requestor who seeks the results of a survey that was sent to residents of the Borough of Saddle River. The survey, which was sent by a local veterinarian who serves on the Borough’s Non-Lethal Deer Population Control Committee, asked residents whether they would allow access to their property to carry out a non-lethal deer management plan. When the requestor filed an OPRA request for the survey results, Saddle River denied the request, claiming that the results were ““inter-agency or intra-agency advisory, consultative or deliberative material.”  We think the Saddle River got it wrong.

The deliberative process privilege applies only to inter-agency and intra-agency communications. The privilege is designed to keep internal policy-making documents confidential. Only internal documents (or documents between one government agency and another) that weigh one policy option over another; that make recommendations; or that offer opinions and advice fall within the privilege. Surveys that are completed by the general public are simply not “inter-agency” or “intra-agency” documents and thus the privilege cannot apply.

There may be times when OPRA’s privacy provision (or some other exemption) may apply to allow some information within a survey to be redacted, however. For example, we litigated Flom v. Allendale Board of Education, Docket No. BER-L-9208-15 (Law Div. Jan 7, 2016), where the requestor sought access to surveys that parents completed regarding their level of satisfaction with the district’s special education program. While the survey was intended to be completed anonymously, some parents put personal identifying information about their children on the forms. The court granted access to the survey results, but permitted the district to redact any information from the survey forms that would identify any student since students are entitled to heightened privacy.

Please contact CJ Griffin at cgriffin@pashmanstein.com or 201.270.4930 for further information.

Appellate Division Rules Agencies Cannot Hide Behind Technology

Last week, the Appellate Division issued a published decision that is very important to transparency.  While the court’s analysis of its standard of review over GRC decisions will excite appellate attorneys, it is the more substantive portion of the court’s decision that grabbed our attention.

The case is Conley v. N.J. Dep’t of Corrections, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. Jan. 12, 2018), and it involves an OPRA request that was filed by Kevin Conley, an inmate at the New Jersey State Prison.

Mr. Conley’s OPRA request sought “monthly remedy statistical reports” that were required to be produced by N.J.A.C. 10A:1-4.8(a)(4) and other federal laws. He had requested these reports in the past and they were always produced, but this time the DOC responded by saying that it had adopted a new computerized database in January 2014 and the requested monthly reports “are no longer generated or available.”

Mr. Conley objected, noting that he had always gotten the reports before and that the DOC was mandated by law to produce these monthly reports. The DOC continued to deny the request, insisting that it no longer generates the reports and that it was not obligated to “create a record.”

Mr. Conley filed a complaint on his own in the Government Records Council (tip: we advise going to court instead!) and lost. The GRC accepted the DOC Custodian’s certification that it did not possess the monthly reports and ruled that it did not violate OPRA.

The Appellate Division reversed the GRC. It noted that the DOC was mandated by federal and State regulations to make the monthly reports. It held that were it to accept the DOC’s argument that the report was no longer available based on the manner by which DOC chose to store this public data, it would render “the public policy of transparency and openness the Legislature codified in [OPRA] unacceptably vulnerable to bureaucratic manipulation.”

Importantly, the Court held that “[t]echnological advancements in data storage should enhance, not diminish, the public’s right to access ‘government records’ under OPRA . . . . A government agency cannot erect technological barriers to deny access to government records.”

What does this mean for OPRA requestors?  This case builds upon the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Paff v. Galloway, which held that electronically stored information is a government record that must be produced. Where an agency is obligated by law to produce a certain type of report or a specific document each month (or year) and it fails to do so because it has moved to an electronic database, it cannot avoid its obligations under OPRA. It would need to pull data from its database to produce the report/document to the requestor.

For assistance with OPRA matters, please contact CJ Griffin at 201-488-8200 or cgriffin@pashmanstein.com.

How to Monitor Police Agencies: Part 3

In this third part of our series about using OPRA to monitor police agencies, we will discuss how to ensure that individual officers meet the qualifications for their duty assignments and are properly trained.

Generally, personnel records are exempt from access under OPRA. However, we previously blogged about the personnel records exemption and explained that there are three exceptions. The third exception provides that the following records are accessible:

data contained in information which disclose conformity with specific experiential, educational or medical qualifications required for government employment or for receipt of a public pension, but not including any detailed medical or psychological information, shall be a government record.

[N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10.]

This means that you are able to obtain any records which prove that an employee meets the requirements of the job.

For police officers, this means that you can obtain training certificates for courses that they are required to take in order to take in order to be police officers. Among the required courses that every police officer in New Jersey must complete include:

  • basic police academy training
  • annual firearms requalification training
  • use of force training
  • vehicular pursuit training
  • domestic violence training
  • cultural diversity training
  • bias intimidation crimes training

Other courses may be necessary in order for a police officer to be promoted or to hold a specific duty assignment. Some of these courses include:

  • Breathalyzer training courses and recertification for those who operate breathalyzers
  • 911 dispatcher and call-taker training and recertification for those who work in 911 call centers
  • K-9 training for those who work with canine partners

Any of these records can be requested and will help the public ensure that officers are properly trained and qualified for the positions that they hold.

Sample OPRA requests:
“Pursuant to OPRA and the common law, I seek the Officer Jones’ use of force training certificates for years 2015-2017.”
“Pursuant to OPRA and the common law, I seek the annual firearms recertification certificates for all of the police officers in your police department for the year 2017.”

A3626 Will Hinder Transparency Over Police Shootings

OPRA permits agencies to withhold most criminal investigatory records, but requires them to disclose certain enumerated information to the public:

if an arrest has been made, information as to the name, address and age of any victims unless there has not been sufficient opportunity for notification of next of kin of any victims of injury and/or death to any such victim or where the release of the names of any victim would be contrary to existing law or court rule. In deciding on the release of information as to the identity of a victim, the safety of the victim and the victim’s family, and the integrity of any ongoing investigation, shall be considered;

if an arrest has been made, information as to the defendant’s name, age, residence, occupation, marital status and similar background information and, the identity of the complaining party unless the release of such information is contrary to existing law or court rule;

information as to the text of any charges such as the complaint, accusation and indictment unless sealed by the court or unless the release of such information is contrary to existing law or court rule;

information as to the identity of the investigating and arresting personnel and agency and the length of the investigation;

information of the circumstances immediately surrounding the arrest, including but not limited to the time and place of the arrest, resistance, if any, pursuit, possession and nature and use of weapons and ammunition by the suspect and by the police; and

information as to circumstances surrounding bail, whether it was posted and the amount thereof.

[N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b).]

This disclosure requirement permits the public to know information about crimes that have occurred in their communities.

Currently pending in the Legislature is A3626, which amends N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) to provide that “personal identifying information of violent crime victims and witnesses are confidential.”  “Personal identifying information” is defined as including, but not limited to the following information about the victim of a violent crime (“a crime involving force or the threat of force”):  “identity, name, home and work addresses, home and work telephone numbers, home and work fax numbers, social security number, driver’s license number, email address, or social media address of a violent crime victim or witness.”

Unfortunately, A3626 will significantly decrease transparency in the State, specifically with regard to police-involved shootings. It is not implausible to think that agencies will argue that officers who witness another officer shoot a suspect are now “witness[es] to a violent crime” (or potential violent crime, as all police-involved shootings are investigated for criminality).  Even under the current statutory scheme, agencies already deny access to the names of officers involved in shootings and other uses of force. See North Jersey Media Group Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 441 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div.), leave to appeal granted, 223 N.J. 553 (2015) (agency argues that public has no right to use of force reports or names of officers involved in shooting a suspect).

Moreover, given that A3626 exempts the identity of a victim, it also plausible that agencies will begin refusing to release information about a specific crime because their response would confirm that a specific person was a victim to the crime. For example, if the media is aware that John Doe was brutally shot and makes a request for Section 3(b) information about John Doe’s shooting, agencies might “neither confirm nor deny” that such shooting occurred because responding to the request would confirm that John Doe was a victim and such information would be exempt under A3626. See North Jersey Media Group Inc. v. Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, 447 N.J. Super. 182 (App. Div. 2016) (permitting agencies to “neither confirm nor deny” the existence of complaints against a specific person where such information is exempt).

While it’s clear that the Sponsors of the bill simply want to protect victims of crime, A3626 is not needed. Most of the actual personal information that A3626 exempts is already exempt, such as social security numbers, telephone numbers, and driver’s license numbers.  See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(a).  Moreover, as it is currently written, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) already permits an agency to withhold the identity of the victim it the agency determines releasing the information “will jeopardize the safety of any person or jeopardize any investigation in progress or may be otherwise inappropriate to release.”

For more information about this blog post or any other OPRA question, please contact cgriffin@pashmanstein.com.

What Personnel Records Can I Obtain Under OPRA?

Personnel records are a category of government records that shine significant light on the workings of government (including misconduct and corruption), but unfortunately our Legislature made most personnel records off limits when it enacted OPRA.  So, what records can you get?

Section 10 of OPRA makes personnel and pension records generally off limits, but it provides three exceptions.  Today, we will discuss the first exception.

The first exception provides that:  “an individual’s name, title, position, salary, payroll record, length of service, date of separation and the reason therefor, and the amount and type of any pension received shall be a government record.”

This means that basic requests for a paystubs, year-end payroll reports, lists of employees, etc., must be granted.   But, this exception can actually provide very helpful information where an employee separates from government employment on suspicious grounds.

Too often, government employees engage in some sort of alleged wrongdoing, but work out an agreement with the governing body that they will simply resign on good terms rather than be terminated. The public is often left in the dark about the real reason why the person left, but the personnel record’s first exception can prove helpful.

The public is entitled to know an employee’s “date of separation and reason therefor,” which is language that was incorporated into OPRA from Executive Order No. 11 (1974).  Our Supreme Court has interpreted this very phrase to mean something more than just telling the public that an employee “resigned.”  Rather, “reason therefor” means the REAL reason the employee resigned – i.e., because several employees accused him of discrimination and misuse of government property and a resignation was agreed upon in exchanged for those employees not suing.

In South Jersey Publishing Co. Inc. v. New Jersey Expressway Authority, 124 N.J. 478 (1991), newspapers reported that an executive director of the N.J. Expressway Authority was under investigation for misuse of credit cards.  The Authority held a closed session meeting with the executive director to discuss the results of the investigation and to work out an agreement for him to separate from employment.  Ultimately, the Authority agreed that the executive director would be paid his full salary, pension, and health care through the end of the year and that the agreement would remain confidential.   The newspapers sought access to the agreement and the closed session minutes, but the Authority denied access to both.  The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the agreement and closed session minutes were accessible, because the “date of separation and reason therefor” included the results of the investigation into misconduct.  The Court rejected the notion that simply informing the public that the executive director had a “voluntary separation” was sufficient and held that “[w]ithout disclosure of the reasons for [the executive director’s] ‘voluntary separation’ from the Authority, the public cannot intelligently make [an evaluation into the reasonableness of the Authority’s agreement with the executive director.]”

Because the Legislature incorporated the “date of separation and reason therefor” directly from Executive Order No. 11, principles of statutory construction inform that the Legislature thus also intended to incorporate case law interpreting and applying Executive Order No. 11.  Thus, South Jersey Publishing Co. is binding and applicable in an OPRA case.

If an employee or public official in your town “resigns” and it seems like something else was going on, we recommend filing an OPRA request seeking closed session minutes, memorandums of understanding or settlement agreements, and the employee’s “date of separation and reason therefor.”

For more information about this blog post or any other OPRA question, please contact cgriffin@pashmanstein.com.

 

The Status of Access to Police Records:  O’Shea, NJMG v. Lyndhurst, and Paff v. OCPO

In enacting OPRA, the Legislature created two exemptions for police records.  The first exemption is the “ongoing investigation exemption.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a).  For that exemption to apply, an investigation must be ongoing and the police agency must prove that release of the records would be “inimical to the public interest.”   Even if the police do prove that releasing the records while the investigation is ongoing would be harmful, ultimately the records must be released after the investigation concludes.

OPRA’s other exemption, the “criminal investigatory records” (CIR) exemption, is much more stringent.  If a record constitutes a CIR, then it is forever exempt from access.  The statute defines a CIR as one that is 1) “not required by law to be made, maintained, or kept on file” and 2) which “pertains to any criminal investigation or related civil enforcement proceeding.”  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.   Both elements must be met in order to shield the record from the public.

Because the very first line of OPRA instructs that “any limitations on the right of access . . . shall be construed in favor of the public’s right of access,” courts have always applied the CIR exemption narrowly.  Accordingly, since 2009, the courts have held that the Attorney General’s Guidelines are “laws” that negate the “not required by law to be made, maintained, or kept on file” element of the CIR exemption.  Thus, records such as Use of Force Reports (UFRs) have been publicly accessible since the AG’s Use of Force Policy requires every officer in the state to complete a UFR after he uses any level of force against a citizen.  See O’Shea v. Twp. of W. Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371 (App. Div. 2009).

That all changed in 2015, when another panel of the Appellate Division disagreed with O’Shea and held that only duly promulgated regulations, executive orders, statutes, or judicial decisions constitute “laws” for purposes of the CIR exemption.  See North Jersey Media Group Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 441 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div.), leave to appeal granted, 223 N.J. 553 (2015). Thus, the court held that even if an AG Guideline requires every officer in the state to make a certain record, that record still is not accessible to the public because it was not required to be made by a “law.”  It also applied the second element of the CIR exemption so broadly that if a record even tangentially relates to a criminal defendant, the court held that it “pertained to any criminal investigation.”  The Appellate Division’s decision in NJMG v. Lyndhurst has been detrimental to transparency because it has rendered nearly every police record off limits!

Since NJMG v. Lyndhurst was decided, agencies have had justification to deny access to UFRs and other police records.  Technically, though, trial courts are not bound by NJMG v. Lyndhurst and could instead apply O’Shea.  This is because when there are conflicting Appellate Division opinions, a trial court is free to choose which decision to apply.  Last week, a third published Appellate Division decision involving the CIR was issued, giving the trial courts another decision to choose from.  See Paff v. Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office, __ N.J. __ (2016).

The Paff court expressly disagreed with NJMG v. Lyndhurst.  It instead held that not only are AG Guidelines “laws” that satisfy the “required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file” standard, but so are local policies and directives from a Chief of Police.  The Paff court also disagreed with NJMG v. Lyndhurst’s holding that “an officer’s decision to activate a [dash cam] to document a traffic stop or pursuit of a suspected criminal violation of the law may make the recording ‘pertain to a criminal investigation, albeit in its earliest stages.’”  Thus, per Paff, dash cam footage is accessible and UFRs would be accessible.

Because there was a dissent in Paff, the case automatically goes to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court also accepted the plaintiff’s appeal in NJMG v. Lyndhurst.  While trial courts are free to apply either O’Shea/Paff or NJMG v. Lyndhurst at the present moment, ultimately the Supreme Court will issue decisions which will be binding upon every court in the state.   Those landmark decisions will define the scope of access to police records and determine how transparent the police must be.

For more information about this blog post or any other OPRA question, please contact cgriffin@pashmanstein.com.

My OPRA Request Was Denied. Now What?

OPRA requires public agencies to respond within 7 business days of your request. (Tip: Begin counting the first business day after you filed the request).  A public agency must respond within 7 business days and either: 1) Produce responsive records; 2) Tell you that access is being denied and reason for the denial; or 3) Ask for an extension of time to respond.

But what do you do if the government fails to respond (a deemed denial) or denies access to a record that you know is not exempt?

The best course of action is to immediately speak to an attorney, who can work with you to gain access to the records.   This frequently requires a lawsuit filed in Superior Court.  The most important thing to remember is that your action must be filed within the statute of limitations, which is 45 days. The process for filing a lawsuit in Superior Court is as follows:

  1. A Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause is filed.  Each county has a designated “OPRA Judge” who will hear the matter.
  2. The OPRA Judge will review and sign the Order to Show Cause, which sets a briefing schedule and a hearing date.
  3. The pleadings are then served upon the public agency and custodian.
  4. Often, a public agency may work with your attorney to settle the case by producing records and paying the attorneys’ fees.
  5. If the parties are unable to settle, the agency will file an answer and opposition to your lawsuit.
  6. Your attorney then has an opportunity to file a reply brief
  7. A hearing is held, wherein the judge will hear arguments from both sides. For simple cases, the Judge will usually enter a ruling that day. More complex cases may require a little more time for an opinion to issue. In certain circumstances, the court may allow for discovery (interrogatories, depositions) to occur.
  8. If you win, the Judge will order the agency to produce records to you and your attorney will file a fee application asking the Court to order the agency to pay your counsel fees and costs of suit.  (Many attorneys, like Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, represent requestors on a contingency basis which means that if you lose, you will not owe any counsel fees).

Again, the most important thing to remember is that there is a very short timeline for filing the initial Verified Complaint – 45 days from the date your request was denied (or, if the agency fails to respond, the date the response was due).

For more information about this blog post or any other OPRA question, please contact cgriffin@pashmanstein.com.

 

 

A Public Agency Must Tell You What Records Exist

Pursuant to Section 5 of OPRA, a public agency must state the “specific basis” for denying access to government records.  Those who request records frequently, however, know that it is not uncommon for a public agency to issue a blanket denial when you’ve requested a volume of records, rather than telling you specifically why each requested record is being withheld.  Yesterday, a court awarded attorneys fees to Pashman Stein in litigation against a public agency who had refused to tell Plaintiff John Paff whether there were records responsive to his request and instead kept making blanket assertions that “any such records” would be exempt as internal affairs records.  You can read more about the decision in Paff v. Township of Stafford on Mr. Paff’s blog.

In making a blanket assertion that any and all records are exempt from access, a public agency not only violates the plain language of Section 5 of OPRA, but also deprives the requestor the ability to determine whether or not he might be entitled to the records under OPRA or the common law right of access.  It also places the requestor in the position of filing suit and then finding out that the records did not even exist in the first place.   In such instances, our courts have still awarded fees to requestors because the public agency’s negligence in not telling the requestor that the record did not exist essentially lured the requestor into litigation.

For example, in Kelley v. Borough of Riverdale, MRS-L-524-14 (Law Div. April 11, 2014) the plaintiff had requested numerous emails that were sent to and from municipal employees, including the custodian regarding litigation.  The custodian responded that plaintiff requested “court records that I cannot and do not have authorization to send you.”  Plaintiff sued.  In opposition to suit, the agency responded that the records, in fact, did not exist and that “as there are no documents to be ‘disclosed,’ this matter should be dismissed.”  The trial court still found an OPRA violation and awarded the plaintiff attorney fees, stating that had the agency not been negligent in giving the requestor an incorrect response to his OPRA request he would not have sued.

Paff v. Stafford and Kelley v. Borough of Riverdale are just two examples of a court finding an OPRA violation for a public agency’s negligence in failing to properly respond to an OPRA request.  This negligence not only deprives an OPRA requestor of the ability to access whether the denial of access was lawful, but also ultimately results in an expenditure of taxpayer funds when the requestor sues.

For more information about this blog post or any other OPRA question, please contact cgriffin@pashmanstein.com.