Tag Archives: access to records

NJ Supreme Court grants certification in OPRA case regarding identity of State Trooper who engaged in “racially offensive” behavior

The New Jersey Supreme Court has granted an OPRA requestor’s Petition for Certification and agreed to hear an appeal in Libertarians for Transparent Government v. New Jersey State Police.

The question the Court certified is:

“Does section ten of the Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10, require disclosure of the name of a state trooper listed in the Office of Professional Standard’s annual report to the Legislature as having been terminated for misconduct?”

For background, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10 states that personnel records are generally exempt under OPRA, but provides three exceptions to the exemption. At issue in this case is the first exception, which states that:

an individual’s name, title, position, salary, payroll record, length of service, date of separation and the reason therefor, and the amount and type of any pension received shall be a government record”

Each year, the Office of Professional Standards of the New Jersey State Police issues a public report detailing major discipline that is imposed upon State Troopers.  The 2015 report disclosed the following:

Member pled guilty to acting in an unofficial capacity to the discredit of the Division while off-duty by having questionable associations, engaging in racially offensive behavior and publicly discussing police patrol procedures. The member was required to forfeit all accrued time and separate from employment with the Division.

Upon reviewing that report, the requestor filed an OPRA request asking for the Trooper’s name, title, date of separation and the reason therefor, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10. The State Police denied the request, arguing that it was exempt pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10 and the Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures.

Pashman Stein Walder Hayden partner CJ Griffin sued on behalf of the requestor and argued that “date of separation and the reason therefor” meant that the public is entitled to know the real reason a particular employee separated from employment. In this case, the State Police gave the reason, but would not provide the name or date of separation, frustrating the statute’s purpose. Clearly, the public has a significant interest in knowing the identity of a Trooper who engaged in “racially offensive behavior.” Moreover, the the phrase “required to . . . separate from employment” makes it unclear whether the Trooper was fired or whether he or she was permitted to retire in good standing and move on to another law enforcement position.

Griffin argued that disclosure of the Trooper’s name was required pursuant to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in South Jersey Publishing Co. v. New Jersey Expressway Authority, 124 N.J. 478 (1991), a unanimous opinion written by retired Supreme Court Justice Gary S. Stein. In that case, it was widely rumored that the agency’s executive director was under scrutiny for misusing government credit cards.  The agency met in executive session and discussed its investigation into the matter, then worked out an agreement by which the executive director would “resign in good standing” and receive payment of his salary and fringe benefits for nearly a year after his “resignation.” OPRA did not exist at the time, but Executive Order No. 11 (EO 11) contained language essentially identical to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10 and required disclosure of an employee’s “date of separation from government service and the reason therefor.”  Applying that provision of EO 11, the Court found it was insufficient for the agency to simply tell the public that there was a “resignation” or “voluntary separation,” but rather that it must disclose “the results of the [agency’s] investigation.”  The Court recognized that disclosure of such information was necessary so that the public could intelligently make an evaluation of whether the agency acted reasonably in permitting the executive director to resign in good standing with several months of salary and benefits.

Unfortunately, in this case, the trial court and Appellate Division both affirmed the State Police’s denial of access. Neither court addressed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in South Jersey Publishing. The Supreme Court will now hear the requestor’s appeal.

The successful Petition for Certification can be found here. Amicus curiae briefs are due on December 26, 2019.

Third Circuit Issues Important OPRA Decision on Legal Fees

According to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, a records requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees. We have written about OPRA’s fee-shifting provision before, noting that without the fee-shift most requestors would not have the funds to challenge denials of access. As a result, the state would be far less transparent.

On August 14, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued an important published opinion relating to OPRA’s mandatory fee-shifting provision.

The case, titled Golden v. New Jersey Institute for Technology, involved OPRA requests filed by Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Daniel Golden, who was seeking records from NJIT to use as research for his book, “Spy Schools: How the CIA, FBI, and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s Universities.” Many of the responsive records in NJIT’s files originated from the FBI and were purportedly subject to prohibitions on public dissemination.

The records custodian reached out to the FBI to determine how to respond to the request and the FBI directed NJIT to withhold most of the records “[i]n no uncertain terms.” NJIT thus denied the OPRA requests by claiming the records were exempt.  Golden sued.

After the lawsuit was filed and removed to federal court, the FBI reviewed the previously withheld records and NJIT produced thousands of pages of documents that it had formerly deemed to be exempt. Golden moved for attorney’s fees, arguing that he was a prevailing party because his lawsuit was the “catalyst” for NJIT’s release of records that were not exempt. The District Court denied the fee motion and was “persuaded by NJIT’s position that it had acted reasonably in following the FBI’s direction.”

The Third Circuit disagreed and all but stated, “If a public agency permits a third party–even if it’s the FBI–to dictate its OPRA response, then that public agency will be on the hook for attorneys’ fees if it turns out that the denial of access was unlawful.” The court made it clear that it is the custodian who has the obligation “to parse the requested records, decide whether exemptions appl[y], and withhold documents pursuant to those exemptions” and that obligation cannot be outsourced to a third party outside the agency.

Importantly, the Third Circuit flatly rejected the argument that OPRA’s fee-shifting provision contains any “reasonableness” requirement. State courts have reached the same conclusion based on the plain language of OPRA, but public agencies still make this argument to trial courts.

This decision is important because there are often times where issues of first impression are litigated and the agency was operating under good faith when it denied a request, but nonetheless was wrong as a matter of law. In such situations, the OPRA requestor is still entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees. Indeed, OPRA contains a mandatory fee-shifting provision so that requestors can find competent counsel to litigate those types of cases.

Exception 2 to OPRA’s Personnel Records Exemption

Last week we discussed Exception 1 to OPRA’s personnel records exemption, which permits you to file an OPRA request for a public employee’s “name, title, position, salary, payroll record, length of service, date of separation and the reason therefor, and the amount and type of any pension received shall be a government record.”  This week, we explore Exception 2.

Exception 2 provides that: “personnel or pension records of any individual shall be accessible when required to be disclosed by another law, when disclosure is essential to the performance of official duties of a person duly authorized by this State or the United States, or when authorized by an individual in interest.”

This Exception has been largely un-litigated and thus the Courts have still not defined the scope of this exception.  In McGee v. Twp. of E. Amwell, 416 N.J. Super. 602, 616, 7 A.3d 785, 793 (App. Div. 2010), the Appellate Division held that emails about an employee were “personnel records” even though they were not filed in a personnel folder and that Exception 2 would permit the employee to request them because she would be an “individual in interest” who could authorize the release.

Regarding the phrase, “personnel or pension records of any individual shall be accessible when required to be disclosed by another law,” we will explore this portion of Exception 2 next week when we explore Exception 3 because the two exceptions work closely together in some instances.

For more information about this blog post or any other OPRA question, please contact cgriffin@pashmanstein.com.