Tag Archives: police conduct

NJ Supreme Court grants certification in OPRA case regarding identity of State Trooper who engaged in “racially offensive” behavior

The New Jersey Supreme Court has granted an OPRA requestor’s Petition for Certification and agreed to hear an appeal in Libertarians for Transparent Government v. New Jersey State Police.

The question the Court certified is:

“Does section ten of the Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10, require disclosure of the name of a state trooper listed in the Office of Professional Standard’s annual report to the Legislature as having been terminated for misconduct?”

For background, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10 states that personnel records are generally exempt under OPRA, but provides three exceptions to the exemption. At issue in this case is the first exception, which states that:

an individual’s name, title, position, salary, payroll record, length of service, date of separation and the reason therefor, and the amount and type of any pension received shall be a government record”

Each year, the Office of Professional Standards of the New Jersey State Police issues a public report detailing major discipline that is imposed upon State Troopers.  The 2015 report disclosed the following:

Member pled guilty to acting in an unofficial capacity to the discredit of the Division while off-duty by having questionable associations, engaging in racially offensive behavior and publicly discussing police patrol procedures. The member was required to forfeit all accrued time and separate from employment with the Division.

Upon reviewing that report, the requestor filed an OPRA request asking for the Trooper’s name, title, date of separation and the reason therefor, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10. The State Police denied the request, arguing that it was exempt pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10 and the Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures.

Pashman Stein Walder Hayden partner CJ Griffin sued on behalf of the requestor and argued that “date of separation and the reason therefor” meant that the public is entitled to know the real reason a particular employee separated from employment. In this case, the State Police gave the reason, but would not provide the name or date of separation, frustrating the statute’s purpose. Clearly, the public has a significant interest in knowing the identity of a Trooper who engaged in “racially offensive behavior.” Moreover, the the phrase “required to . . . separate from employment” makes it unclear whether the Trooper was fired or whether he or she was permitted to retire in good standing and move on to another law enforcement position.

Griffin argued that disclosure of the Trooper’s name was required pursuant to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in South Jersey Publishing Co. v. New Jersey Expressway Authority, 124 N.J. 478 (1991), a unanimous opinion written by retired Supreme Court Justice Gary S. Stein. In that case, it was widely rumored that the agency’s executive director was under scrutiny for misusing government credit cards.  The agency met in executive session and discussed its investigation into the matter, then worked out an agreement by which the executive director would “resign in good standing” and receive payment of his salary and fringe benefits for nearly a year after his “resignation.” OPRA did not exist at the time, but Executive Order No. 11 (EO 11) contained language essentially identical to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10 and required disclosure of an employee’s “date of separation from government service and the reason therefor.”  Applying that provision of EO 11, the Court found it was insufficient for the agency to simply tell the public that there was a “resignation” or “voluntary separation,” but rather that it must disclose “the results of the [agency’s] investigation.”  The Court recognized that disclosure of such information was necessary so that the public could intelligently make an evaluation of whether the agency acted reasonably in permitting the executive director to resign in good standing with several months of salary and benefits.

Unfortunately, in this case, the trial court and Appellate Division both affirmed the State Police’s denial of access. Neither court addressed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in South Jersey Publishing. The Supreme Court will now hear the requestor’s appeal.

The successful Petition for Certification can be found here. Amicus curiae briefs are due on December 26, 2019.

Justices Weigh Public’s Right to Know in Fatal Cop Encounters

The following article was posted on Northjersey.com on November 9, 2016 edition. It describes an argument before the New Jersey Supreme Court in one of the most consequential Open Public Records Act cases in State history. Our partner Sam Samaro is lead counsel for North Jersey Media Group and our firm spearheaded the appeal.

In one of the biggest legal battles over government transparency in New Jersey, the state Supreme Court is poised to determine how much information the public receives in the hours and days after police officers use fatal force.

A key question in the case is whether law enforcement agencies must release records that name police officers who use fatal force in the line of duty. Another is whether dashboard-camera videos of such incidents are public or confidential.

The justices heard nearly two hours of oral argument on Wednesday in an appeal filed by North Jersey Media Group, a division of Gannett that publishes The Record. MORE

 

The Status of Access to Police Records:  O’Shea, NJMG v. Lyndhurst, and Paff v. OCPO

In enacting OPRA, the Legislature created two exemptions for police records.  The first exemption is the “ongoing investigation exemption.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a).  For that exemption to apply, an investigation must be ongoing and the police agency must prove that release of the records would be “inimical to the public interest.”   Even if the police do prove that releasing the records while the investigation is ongoing would be harmful, ultimately the records must be released after the investigation concludes.

OPRA’s other exemption, the “criminal investigatory records” (CIR) exemption, is much more stringent.  If a record constitutes a CIR, then it is forever exempt from access.  The statute defines a CIR as one that is 1) “not required by law to be made, maintained, or kept on file” and 2) which “pertains to any criminal investigation or related civil enforcement proceeding.”  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.   Both elements must be met in order to shield the record from the public.

Because the very first line of OPRA instructs that “any limitations on the right of access . . . shall be construed in favor of the public’s right of access,” courts have always applied the CIR exemption narrowly.  Accordingly, since 2009, the courts have held that the Attorney General’s Guidelines are “laws” that negate the “not required by law to be made, maintained, or kept on file” element of the CIR exemption.  Thus, records such as Use of Force Reports (UFRs) have been publicly accessible since the AG’s Use of Force Policy requires every officer in the state to complete a UFR after he uses any level of force against a citizen.  See O’Shea v. Twp. of W. Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371 (App. Div. 2009).

That all changed in 2015, when another panel of the Appellate Division disagreed with O’Shea and held that only duly promulgated regulations, executive orders, statutes, or judicial decisions constitute “laws” for purposes of the CIR exemption.  See North Jersey Media Group Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 441 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div.), leave to appeal granted, 223 N.J. 553 (2015). Thus, the court held that even if an AG Guideline requires every officer in the state to make a certain record, that record still is not accessible to the public because it was not required to be made by a “law.”  It also applied the second element of the CIR exemption so broadly that if a record even tangentially relates to a criminal defendant, the court held that it “pertained to any criminal investigation.”  The Appellate Division’s decision in NJMG v. Lyndhurst has been detrimental to transparency because it has rendered nearly every police record off limits!

Since NJMG v. Lyndhurst was decided, agencies have had justification to deny access to UFRs and other police records.  Technically, though, trial courts are not bound by NJMG v. Lyndhurst and could instead apply O’Shea.  This is because when there are conflicting Appellate Division opinions, a trial court is free to choose which decision to apply.  Last week, a third published Appellate Division decision involving the CIR was issued, giving the trial courts another decision to choose from.  See Paff v. Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office, __ N.J. __ (2016).

The Paff court expressly disagreed with NJMG v. Lyndhurst.  It instead held that not only are AG Guidelines “laws” that satisfy the “required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file” standard, but so are local policies and directives from a Chief of Police.  The Paff court also disagreed with NJMG v. Lyndhurst’s holding that “an officer’s decision to activate a [dash cam] to document a traffic stop or pursuit of a suspected criminal violation of the law may make the recording ‘pertain to a criminal investigation, albeit in its earliest stages.’”  Thus, per Paff, dash cam footage is accessible and UFRs would be accessible.

Because there was a dissent in Paff, the case automatically goes to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court also accepted the plaintiff’s appeal in NJMG v. Lyndhurst.  While trial courts are free to apply either O’Shea/Paff or NJMG v. Lyndhurst at the present moment, ultimately the Supreme Court will issue decisions which will be binding upon every court in the state.   Those landmark decisions will define the scope of access to police records and determine how transparent the police must be.

For more information about this blog post or any other OPRA question, please contact cgriffin@pashmanstein.com.

Transparency of Police Conduct Consistent with Public’s Right to Know

The following article was authored by Pashman Stein Partner Sam Samaro and appeared in the New Jersey Law Journal on October 29, 2015.

In March of 1991, a Los Angeles resident by the name of George Holliday noticed some commotion outside his apartment. He grabbed a camcorder, went out onto his balcony and shot the now iconic footage of Rodney King being beaten by the police. The resulting prosecution of the officers involved occurred because, and only because, the incident happened to take place within eyeshot of a citizen with a video camera. At the time, videotaped evidence of police misconduct was extremely rare.

Today, it is not so rare. It has been estimated that as many as two-thirds of all American adults own smart phones. That means that most people walking the streets these days are carrying high-quality video equipment in their pockets or purses, and ever more frequently they are using those devices to record what they see in their daily lives, including altercations involving the police. On top of that, state and local governments have come under increasing pressure to add camera equipment to patrol cars and even patrol officer uniforms. As a consequence, police departments in many communities are now required to make their own video recordings of traffic stops, arrests and other interactions with citizens. We can anticipate a time when most things police do in public will be recorded by someone.

It is fair to say that law enforcement agencies are less than enthusiastic about this development. They argue, not without merit, that the videos only tell part of the story and often contain important evidence which, if released too soon, could compromise ongoing criminal investigations of suspects or internal affairs investigations of officers. They worry that the repeated showing of such videos in the media and their availability online creates unjustified cynicism about the police and may actually subject officers to retribution attacks.

For the rest of the article, please click here.